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Abstract
Article 19(1) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act prescribes that an 
anticompetitive “agreement” among enterprisers exists as a requirement for establishing an 
unreasonable collaborative act. The requirements and standards that are necessary for finding 
the existence of an “agreement” based on information exchange as evidentiary grounds when 
there is an information exchange without any explicit agreement or direct evidence has become a 
critical legal issue in Korea
While lower courts previously provided legal standards in regard to such issue, in July 
2014, for the first time the Korean Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision regarding the 
requirements and determination standards for finding information exchange among competitors 
as an agreement in the case concerning information exchange by sixteen life insurance 
companies.
In the above case, the Korean Supreme Court held that (i) under the MRFTA the existence 
of an unreasonable collaborative act was not directly established based solely on the existence of 
information exchange, although information exchange can be used as compelling evidence in 
finding reciprocity in meeting of the minds among enterprisers and (ii) in such case, the 
existence of an agreement has to be established by comprehensively considering the totality of 
circumstances, such as the structure and special characteristics of the relevant market and the 
nature and details of the exchanged information, etc.
In sum, it may be viewed that courts in Korea continue to develop an autonomous theory of 
interpretation in order to regulate information exchange as an unreasonable collaborative act, 
while not damaging the significance of the existence of an “agreement” under the current 
MRFTA regime. 
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I. Introduction
As surveillance and sanctions for cartel activities by competition 
authorities worldwide are intensified, the structure of cartels formed by 
corporations are becoming more artful and concealed.  In this connection, 
in large-scale cartel cases that were recently exposed, it is difficult to find 
explicit agreements or direct evidence in regard to the existence of 
agreements (e.g., “written agreements” or other such evidence). Rather, 
cases with only tacit understandings based on information exchange 
among competitors are gradually becoming more prevalent.
However, since “information exchange” itself simultaneously possesses 
both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects,1) it is not easy to 
determine the illegality of such act.  Therefore, competition authorities, 
including those in the U.S. and the EU, have developed legal theories in 
connection with the determination of illegality in information exchange and 
have made efforts to regulate such suspected exchanges. The courts in 
Korea and the Korea Fair Trade Commission (Gongjeonggeorae Wiewonhui; 
hereinafter KFTC) have also developed legal theories to regulate 
information exchange among competitors involving important 
management or sales information such as prices, sales conditions and 
production plans as “unreasonable collaborative acts” in circumstances 
where explicit agreements among enterprisers are absent or lacking.
In particular, the Korean courts will find the existence of unreasonable 
collaborative acts only in circumstances where an “agreement” as defined 
under Article 19(1) (hereinafter Article 19(1) Agreement) of the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act (Dokjeom Gyuje Mit Gongjeonggeoraeye 
1) Information exchange has pro-competitive effects of promoting competition by 
enhancing market transparency and of increasing benefits to consumers by reducing the 
information search cost incurred by the consumers. At the same time, however, information 
exchange can cause anticompetitive effects of aiding in cartel behaviors by facilitating the 
establishment of joint strategies among corporations and reducing the cost of monitoring 
withdrawals from the cartel agreements, and of impeding new entries into the market by 
creating a barrier to entry against those corporations that cannot share information. See Rhee 
Sangkyu, Saoebjagan Jeongbogyohwanhaengwieeui Gyeongjejeog Hyogwa Mit Gyuje Gijun 
[Economic Effect of and Regulatory Standards for Information Exchange between Enterprisers], 176 
GyeonGjaenGjournal [journal of Competition] 88-89 (Sept. 2014).
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Gwanhan Beobryul; hereinafter MRFTA) can be established and when a 
certain type of agreement is discovered. However, since information 
exchange is not included in the certain type of agreement which constitutes 
an unreasonable collaborative act under Article 19(1), how the “agreement” 
can be discovered may become a critical issue in establishing the existence 
of collaborative acts in circumstances where only information exchange is 
present without any evidence of explicit agreements. In connection with the 
foregoing, in July 2014, the Korean Supreme Court rendered an important 
decision regarding the requirements and determination standards for 
finding information exchange among competitors as an agreement in the 
case concerning information exchange by sixteen life insurance companies 
(hereinafter Life Insurer Case).2)
In the following sections, this article will (1) first examine the 
requirements for establishing “unreasonable collaborative acts” under the 
MRFTA and (2) then introduce exemplary cases where “information 
exchange” was examined as the main issue (i.e., court precedents and KFTC 
decisions). (3) Finally, this article will examine the essential points of the 
decision by the Korean Supreme Court in the Life Insurer Case and the 
significance of such decision.
II.  An “Agreement” as a Requirement for Establishing 
Unreasonable Collaborative Acts
1.  Statutory Provision and the Significance of an “Agreement” as a 
Requirement for Establishing Illegality
Article 19(1) of the MRFTA prescribes that an anticompetitive “agreement” 
among enterprisers is a requirement for establishing an unreasonable collaborative 
act. The courts broadly interpret the term “agreement” to include, “not only 
explicit agreements, but also mutual recognition or understanding for the 
existence of a meeting of the minds, tacit understanding or an implied 
agreement.”3) Therefore, even when explicit agreements are absent, so long 
2) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2013Do16951, July 24, 2014 (S. Kor.). 
3) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Do1239, Feb. 28, 2003 (S. Kor.); See also, Supreme Court 
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as the KFTC successfully establishes the existence of a “tacit agreement” or 
“implied agreement” using indirect or circumstantial evidence such as 
information exchange or information provision, collaborative acts may be 
found to exist in such circumstances.
MRFTA, Article 19 (Prohibition of Unreasonable Collaborative Acts)
(1)  No enterpriser shall engage in an agreement with other enterprisers by 
contract, arrangement, resolution or any other means to jointly engage in 
any of the following acts,4) which unreasonably restrains competition 
(hereinafter referred to as “unreasonable collaborative act”), or allow any 
other enterpriser to commit such unreasonable collaborative act (emphasis 
added).
4)
Meanwhile, Article 19(5)5) of the MRFTA stipulates that an agreement to 
[S. Ct.], 2002Do4648, May 27, 2003 (S. Kor.).
4) Article 19(1) of the MRFTA enumerates the following nine types of acts as subjects of 
agreements that unreasonably restrain competition:
1. Fixing, maintaining or changing prices; 
2.  Determining terms and conditions for the transaction of goods or services, the prices or 
the conditions of payment thereof;
3.  Restricting production, delivery, transportation or transaction of goods or restricting 
transaction of services;
4. Restricting the area in which a transaction arises or the transacting counterparty;
5.  Preventing or restricting the establishment or extension of facilities or the installation of 
equipment necessary for the production of goods or the rendering of services;
6.  Restricting the types and standards of goods or services when producing or trading 
such goods or services; 
7.  Jointly performing or managing the main parts of business or establishing a company, 
etc. to jointly perform or manage the business; 
8.  Deciding successful bidder, successful auctioneer, bidding price, winning bid price or 
contract price and other matters prescribed by the Presidential Decree; and 
9.  Substantially restricting competition in a particular business area by means of 
interfering or restricting the activities or contents of business of other enterprisers 
(including the enterpriser who has conducted the activity), which is distinct from the 
acts referred to in subparagraphs 1 through 8. 
5) The current version of Article 19(5) of the MRFTA, which was amended in August 
2007, is as follows: 
 “Where two or more enterprisers commit an act falling under any subparagraph of 
paragraph (1), it shall be presumed that the enterprisers have agreed to commit an act in 
association falling under any subparagraph of paragraph (1) when it is highly probable to 
deem that they committed the act in a collaborative manner when considering the totality 
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commit any of the acts described in each of the subparagraphs of Article 
19(1) of the MRFTA may be “presumed” so long as certain requirements 
are satisfied, even in the absence of an explicit agreement. This statutory 
provision which grants a legal presumption for the existence of an 
“agreement”, which is an essential requirement to find the existence of a 
collaborative act once certain requirements are satisfied is a unique 
provision that is not found in legislative examples in any other jurisdiction.
However, as examined above, due to the courts’ broad interpretation of 
the scope of an Article 19(1) Agreement, there is no real difference between 
establishing the existence of such agreement based on combining several 
indirect or circumstantial evidence when no direct evidence is available, or 
applying the presumption provision of Article 19(5) of the MRFTA. 
Accordingly, the KFTC directly applies Article 19(1) of the MRFTA to a 
majority of the cases that it examines, while the presumption provision of 
Article 19(5) of the MRFTA is rarely utilized in actual practice. Therefore, 
the following discussion will focus on the applicability of Article 19(1) of 
the MRFTA.
2.  The Relationship between Information Exchange and Unreasonable 
Collaborative Acts
If the suspected enterprisers are found to have explicitly engaged in a 
cartel perpetrated by information exchange, an agreement would not be 
difficult to find. However, if the only available fact is that the competitors 
exchanged price and/or other information (e.g. information exchange) 
without any evidence establishing the existence of specific agreements, the 
following issues may become important in discussing whether 
unreasonable collaborative acts can be established in a given case involving 
information exchange: (i) whether information exchange itself or an agreement to 
engage in such exchange can be sanctioned as an “unreasonable collaborative act” 
and/or (ii) what requirements and standards are necessary for finding an 
“agreement” (to increase price, reduce output etc.) based on information exchange 
of the circumstances, including the characteristic of the relevant goods or services, 
economic reasons and ripple effects of the relevant activity, and frequency and mode of 
contact among enterprisers, etc.”
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as evidentiary grounds. 
First, the EU regulates illegal collaborative acts by applying Article 
101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter 
TFEU), which currently bans “concerted practices”, which do not require 
an agreement as an element. Therefore, under the current regulatory 
regime in the EU, information exchange itself may be found to be illegal if it 
constitutes a “concerted practice.” Moreover, in the U.S., an agreement to 
engage in information exchange may be found to be illegal if such 
agreement restrains trade or commerce since Article 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act does not specifically enumerate the types of agreements that 
may be deemed to be illegal.
Contrastingly, according to the statutory interpretation of Article 19(1) 
of the MRFTA, the Korean competition law regime does not deem 
“information exchange” or “agreement to participate in information 
exchange” to independently constitute an unreasonable collaborative act 
(e.g. cartel). The basis of the foregoing interpretation is that, although 
Article 19(1) of the MRFTA prohibits any “agreement” to commit acts 
included in subparagraphs 1 through 9 of the same provision,6) information 
exchange is not included in such prohibited acts. Therefore, while 
information exchange may be utilized as indirect or circumstantial evidence 
in establishing the existence of an agreement to commit the enumerated 
acts in Article 19(1) of the MRFTA, the actual participation in information 
exchange or an agreement to participate in such exchange alone cannot be 
found to violate Article 19(1) of the MRFTA.
Despite the above, the KFTC has invited criticisms for contradicting the 
existing precedents and statutory interpretations by taking the position of 
considering “information exchange itself” as a prohibited unreasonable 
collaborative act under Article 19(1) of the MRFTA in certain cases where 
the legality of information exchange was at issue.7)8) The decision in the Life 
6) Id.
7) Examples of such cases are (i) the case concerning unreasonable collaborative acts by 
five cheese industry enterprisers and (ii) the case concerning unreasonable collaborative acts 
by four ramen noodle industry enterprisers. The above two cases will be introduced in Section 
III. 1. of this article. 
8) See also Han Seung Hyuck, Jeongbogyohwanhaengwiewa Gongdonghaengwieeui Gwangye 
[The Relationship between Information Exchange and Collaborative Acts], 170 GyeonGjaenGjournal 
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Insurer Case, which this article will examine in detail, is significant because 
it offered a response to the above issue.
Moreover, since the discussions in Korea have developed with a focus 
on the value of information exchange as circumstantial evidence in 
presuming the existence of an agreement, the precedents that developed 
the legal theories regarding the requirements and determination standards 
for finding the existence of an agreement through “information exchange” 
as well as the cases that dealt with information exchange as the main issue 
will be examined below in order to review the trend in the courts’ and the 
KFTC’s jurisprudence regarding information exchange.
III.  Precedents and Decisions Regarding Information 
Exchange and Establishing Unreasonable Collaborative 
Acts
1.  Cases which found Establishment of Unreasonable Collaborative Acts 
through Information Exchange 
1)  Case Concerning Unreasonable Collaborative Acts by Five Beverage 
Manufacturers and Sellers
In 2008 and 2009, five beverage manufacturers and sellers agreed to 
jointly increase prices of their beverage products on three separate 
occasions. They also continuously held meetings composed of CEO-level, 
sales director-level and market research director-level employees and 
executives and exchanged information regarding monthly sales targets and 
performance data, contents of promotions, release of new products 
(including the sales prices), sales strategies and price increase plans. The 
KFTC viewed such information exchange as a basis for establishing the 
existence of an “agreement” and imposed administrative surcharges on the 
[journal of Competition] 95 (Sept. 2013); Ahn Chang Heon, Budanghan Gongdonghaengwieeui 
Silmusang Jaengjeomye Daehan Geomto [Review on Practical Issues of Unreasonable Collaborative 
Acts], 43 Byeonhosa [laWyer] 406-407 (2013); Ahn Byung Hoon, Jeongbogyohwanhaengwiewa 
Habeuieui Chujeong [Information Exchange and Presumption of Agreement], 178 
GyeonGjaenGjournal [journal of Competition] 47 (Jan. 2013).
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offending enterprisers by applying Article 19(1) of the MRFTA.9) 
The five enterprisers subsequently filed separate administrative 
lawsuits with the Seoul High Court objecting to the KFTC decision.10) In the 
ensuing litigation, the Seoul High Court presented a determination 
standard for the establishment of collaborative acts through information 
exchange for the first time. 
In the foregoing case, the Seoul High Court held:
“Information exchange may serve as compelling evidence in 
establishing the existence of an agreement depending on the structure 
and characteristics of the relevant market, the subject of the 
information, the nature and contents of the information, the timing 
of the information exchange and the subject and method of 
information exchange.  In connection with the foregoing, the 
exchange of information regarding the price and production among 
competitors may serve as means to promote cartel activities or to 
facilitate the execution of cartel agreements by increasing 
transparency in the market (emphasis added).”
More specifically, the Seoul High Court opined:
“The closer [the information exchange at issue] constitutes the 
following circumstances, the more such information exchange threatens 
free and fair competition in the market and may serve as compelling 
evidence in establishing collaborative acts among enterprisers: (i) when 
information exchange among competitors occurs in a market which 
is relatively more oligopolistic and concentrated than other markets 
or in a market with high homogeneity in product specifications, 
qualities or other features so that such information exchange would 
make the relevant market more transparent (structure and character of 
the market); (ii) when the exchanged information is not statistical data 
9) See KftC Decision, 2009-249, Nov. 9, 2009 (S. Kor.).
10) See MRFTA, Article 55 (The Seoul High Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over 
any first-instance trial of administrative lawsuits filed in objection to the decision of the 
KFTC). 
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such as demand or production volume, but, rather, information that 
is generally deemed to be trade secrets and a core element in 
competition such as price increase plans or details of price increases 
(subject of information); (iii) when the item, price increase rate (range) 
and other relevant characteristics of a product, which are the subjects 
of the information exchanged, are more specific and segmented 
(content of information); (iv) when the timing of information exchange 
occurs before other competitors’ decisions to increase prices or 
before the disclosure and dissemination of such information in the 
market, and when such information exchange is carried out 
continuously or repeatedly (timing and method of information 
exchange); and (v) when information exchange is carried out furtively 
and exclusively among a few related enterprisers with the exclusion 
of consumers, and the parties involved are employees and officers 
with actual influence on the pricing decision of their respective 
companies as opposed to those employed in branch offices engaged 
in sales activities (perpetrator of information exchange) (emphasis 
added).”11)12)13)
After the foregoing decision by the Seoul High Court, the new legal 
11) See Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2009Nu38406 & 2009Nu38390, Nov. 25, 2010 
(S. Kor.). 
12) The standard for determining illegality of information exchange offered in the 
foregoing decision is arguably very similar to the standard presented by the EU. See 
Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 11).
13) Based on the foregoing standard, the Seoul High Court rendered separate decisions 
for each individual enterpriser regarding the inquiry of whether the act at issue constitutes an 
unreasonable collaborative act. In other words, for “Haetae Beverage Co., Ltd.”, the court held 
that there was an agreement, while holding, for “Woongjin Foods Co., Ltd.” that there was no 
agreement in the first price increase (the court found agreements in the second and third price 
increases). However, the Korean Supreme Court reversed and remanded the original decision 
from the Seoul High Court on the ground that it contained illegal judicial review arising from 
“[the lower court’s] misunderstanding of the legal theory regarding the definition of relevant 
market”, See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Do28939, Feb. 13, 2013 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. 
Ct.], 2011Do204, Feb. 14, 2013 (S. Kor.). The individual decisions are still being reviewed in the 
Seoul High Court. See Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], Case No. 2013Nu8020, Seoul High 
Court [Seoul High Ct.], Case No. 2013Nu8037.
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theory of potentially using information exchange as compelling evidence in 
establishing the existence of an agreement was widely cited in various cases 
involving unreasonable collaborative acts perpetrated by information 
exchange. The representative cases are as follows:
2)  Case Concerning Unreasonable Collaborative Acts by Twelve Dairy 
Products Enterprisers14)
The KFTC imposed sanctions on twelve dairy products enterprisers 
suspected of engaging in unreasonable collaborative acts based on a finding 
of the following facts: (i) the suspected enterprisers, which manufacture 
and sell dairy products, formed groups called “Yumaekhui” and 
“Wubanghui” and held regular meetings early every month from January 
1984 at which time they mutually exchanged their respective sales data, 
new product information, promotion plans and product price information 
and (ii) the enterprisers “agreed” to gradually increase prices by 
exchanging price increase proposals for each product between 2008 and 
2009. In response to such sanctions, the corresponding enterprisers 
contended that unreasonable collaborative acts cannot be established in the 
foregoing case by offering the following countervailing evidence: (a) the 
exchanged information was either non-price information or information 
that has already been disclosed in the market and (b) the price alignment 
circumstances alleged by the KFTC can occur in the relevant market 
without agreements due to the characteristics of the dairy products market. 
However, the Seoul High Court directly cited the determination standard 
presented in the beverage cartel case explained above and held:
“In the oligopolistic sales market for market milk and fermented 
milk, the twelve enterprisers’ act of adjusting the range and timing 
of the price increase by exchanging specific product prices, price 
14) See KftC decision, 2011-051, May 2, 2011 (S. Kor.); see also, Seoul High Court [Seoul 
High Ct.], 2011Nu18467, Jan. 12, 2012 (S. Kor.) (Plaintiff Binggrae lost in the Seoul High Court 
and the appeal was denied); Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2011Nu27584, Apr. 12, 2012. 
(S. Kor.) (Plaintiff Namyang Dairy Products Co., Ltd. lost in the Seoul High Court and the 
appeal was dismissed in the Supreme Court. See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Do10093, Aug. 
30, 2012 (S. Kor.)); Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2011Nu18719, Mar. 21, 2012 (S. Kor.) 
(Plaintiff Korea Yakult Co., Ltd. lost in the Seoul High Court).
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increase plans and other relevant price information, which are core 
elements of competition, is not a simple [manifestation of] conscious 
parallelism, but rather constitutes a concerted practice. Therefore, 
such act by the enterprisers establishes an unreasonable 
collaborative act because an ‘agreement’ for a collaborative act can 
be presumed in the present case.”
3)  Case Concerning Unreasonable Collaborative Acts by Five Cheese 
Manufacturers and Sellers15)
The KFTC imposed sanctions on five cheese manufacturers and sellers 
suspected of engaging in unreasonable collaborative acts on the following 
grounds: (i) the five cheese manufacturers and sellers exchanged company 
sales data, new product information, promotion plans and price 
information through a group called the “Cheese Distribution Information 
Conference” from 1992 to November 2009 and (ii) the foregoing 
enterprisers agreed to increase prices based on the above information 
exchange between 2007 and 2011. The Korean Supreme Court also affirmed 
the finding that collaborative acts were established by holding that “the five 
enterprisers shared information on price increases at the meetings and 
agreed to implement price increases based on the exchanged information 
and on each company’s respective circumstances.”
However, in determining the existence of an “agreement”, the KFTC 
opined that “The so-called ‘information exchange’ among competitors may 
serve a compelling evidence in establishing the existence of an agreement 
depending on the character or content of the information, the timing and 
scope of the exchange and the perpetrator or method of the exchange.  In 
connection with the foregoing, the exchange of price and production information 
among competitors is also deemed to be a type of explicit cartel based on the facts 
that such exchange either aids in the formation of a cartel or facilitates the 
execution of a cartel (emphasis added).” The KFTC also characterized 
“information exchange as anticompetitive”, thereby taking a position 
15) See KftC decision, 2011-143, Aug. 9, 2011 (S. Kor.); see also, Seoul High Court [Seoul 
High Ct.], 2011Nu32739, Aug. 30, 2012. (S. Kor.) (Plaintiff Namyang Dairy Products Co., Ltd. 
lost in the Seoul High Court and the appeal was dismissed in the Korean Supreme Court [S. 
Ct.], 2011Do21413, Feb. 15, 2013. (S. Kor.)).
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similar to those assumed by the competition authorities in the EU and the 
U.S., where “information exchange” itself is deemed to be a type of 
unreasonable collaborative act.16) As previously noted, such position has 
been met with criticisms that it did not conform to the text of the MRFTA.17)
4)  Case Concerning Unreasonable Collaborative Acts by Four Ramen Noodle 
Enterprisers18)
The KFTC uncovered that the ramen noodle manufacturers continuously 
and systematically exchanged information on price increase plans, increase 
details, production date of the products subject to the price increases, 
shipment dates, sales performance data and targets, new product launch 
dates, promotion plans and other relevant information in an oligopolistic 
market, to be used as an essential means to execute a cartel agreement. The 
KFTC subsequently imposed sanctions on the enterprisers for jointly 
increasing prices of ramen noodle products in six separate occasions 
between May 2001 and February 2010 through participating in information 
exchange.19) In its review of the foregoing decision, the Seoul High Court 
held that the KFTC’s disposition was lawful by inferring an implied agreement 
among enterprisers to jointly fix prices based on the following grounds: (i) 
there was an explicit agreement regarding the first price increase and (ii) 
16) See KftC decision, 2011-143, Aug. 9, 2011 (S. Kor.) (at 71-75).
17) See supra notes 8-9. 
18) See KftC Decision, 2012-107, July 12, 2012 (S. Kor.); see also, Seoul High Court [Seoul 
High Ct.], 2012Nu24223, Nov. 8, 2013 (S. Kor.) (Plaintiff Nongshim Co., Ltd. lost in the Seoul 
High Court and the appeal is currently in progress in the Korean Supreme Court. Supreme 
Court [S. Ct.], Case No. 2013Do25924 (S. Kor.)). 
19) Also in the ramen noodle cartel case, the KFTC rendered a decision similar to that of 
the cheese cartel case and held that “the exchange of price and production information among 
competitors could be deemed to be a type of explicit collaborative act” (KftC Decision, 2012-
107, July 12, 2012 (S. Kor.) at 112), thereby resuming its position of hinting at a possible 
conclusion that information exchange itself may be found to constitute an unreasonable 
collaborative act. In its review of the KFTC decision, the Seoul High Court took a different 
position from the KFTC in holding that “information exchange alone cannot per se show that 
there was an agreement for unreasonable collaborative acts”, see Seoul High Court [Seoul 
High Ct.], 2012Nu24223, Nov. 8, 2013 (S. Kor.). However, the court nonetheless held that, in 
light of the various indirect facts other than information exchange in the ramen noodle case, 
an implicit agreement may be found among the enterprisers and consequently affirmed the 
legality of the KFTC’s disposition in its conclusion. 
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there was a continuous exchange of key information such as price 
information among the enterprisers even after the first price increase and 
there was external conformity in price increases after the exchange.
2.  A Case that Rejected the Existence of an Agreement Despite Evidence 
of Information Exchange
In a case where an employee of the largest enterpriser (market share of 
55.8%) among four packaged kimchi manufacturers and sellers shared its 
price increase plans to the employees of the second and third largest 
enterprisers (market shares of 7.1% and 6.2%, respectively), the KFTC 
deemed that it was difficult to find the existence of an “agreement” despite 
the existence of information exchange after considering the structure of the 
packaged kimchi market, the timing and method of information exchange 
and the perpetrator of information exchange.20)
The KFTC found it difficult to establish the existence of an “Article 19(1) 
Agreement”, despite the existence of the act of providing the price increase 
plans to the competitors, after comprehensively considering the following 
facts: (i) the personnel that exchanged information were merely salespersons 
or manager-level employees; (ii) the timing of the employee’s sharing of the 
price increase plan was after such plan had been internally decided and 
notified to the vendors; (iii) the sharing of price increase plans only 
occurred two or three times; (iv) the increase plans were merely divulged 
passively in response to the requests from the second and third largest 
enterprisers and the employee of the largest enterpriser did not first 
divulge the information to its counterparts; (v) the largest enterpriser never 
inquired about the price increase plans of the second and third largest 
enterprisers; (vi) the packaged kimchi products are highly diversified and 
the gap in brand recognition between the largest enterpriser and its 
competitors was significant, and the price gap also amounted to 20%; and 
(vii) the price increase alignment by other enterprisers, based on the 
previous price increase structure of the largest enterpriser, was not 
20) Kim Hak-Hyun, Wiebeobhan Damhapyi Doeneun Ilbangjeok Jeongbojegong [Unilateral 
Information Exchange Constituting Illegal Cartel], 161 GyeonGjaenGjournal [journal of 
Competition] 32-33 (Apr. 2012). 
46 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 15: 33
specifically important as a considered factor in the largest enterpriser’s 
decision to increase prices, rather the main consideration involved the 
successful outcomes of negotiations with the large vendors.21)
IV. Decision in the Life Insurer Case
1. Summary 
1) Decision by the KFTC
On December 15, 2011, the KFTC issued a corrective order and order to 
cease the exchange of information and imposed administrative surcharges 
pursuant to Article 19(1) of the MRFTA against sixteen life insurance 
companies based on its finding that “the enterprisers engaged in the 
following unreasonable collaborative acts in the personal life insurance 
market in connection with estimated interest rates of fixed-interest products 
and nominal interest rates of floating-interest products (hereinafter 
Estimated Interest Rates, Etc.), which are respectively considered as the 
product prices for specific insurance products.22)23)
21) In regard to cases where, based on the results of the KFTC’s investigation a decision 
was made that there was no violation of the MRFTA, the KFTC does not publically disclose 
such decision through a non-violation decision, etc. Therefore, aside from the case introduced 
above, more cases may exist where the KFTC found that there was no unreasonable 
collaborative act despite the existence of information exchange.
22) See KftC Decision, 2011-284, Dec. 15, 2011 (S. Kor.).
23) However, in calculating the administrative surcharges, the KFTC viewed the 
commencement date of the violation period subject to the imposition of administrative 
surcharges to be the earlier date of “when the estimated interested rate first changed” or 
“when the new product applying the new nominal interest rate was first launched”, which 
were both after June 2000, upon considering the following facts: (i) the estimated and nominal 
interest rates were identical or similar until early 2000 due to the industry custom of joint 
product development; (ii) the KFTC notified the insurance companies in June 2000 that it 
would impose strict sanctions on any unreasonable collaborative acts executed in connection 
with the joint development and sale of insurance products; and (iii) the products which 
applied the old nominal interest rates were developed to react to the extraordinary 
circumstances triggered by the foreign exchange crisis. Consequently, those product subject to 
an agreement in the First Conduct of fixing Estimated Interest Rates, Etc. were excluded from 
the imposition of administrative surcharges (i.e., excluded from the relevant products).
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•  First Conduct:  The sixteen life insurance companies agreed to fix the 
Estimated Interest Rates, Etc. at specific levels or to jointly reduce such 
interest rates on multiple occasions from 1998 to 2000.
•  Second Conduct:  The sixteen life insurance companies mutually shared 
information on the future Estimated Interest Rates, Etc. that was not publicly 
disclosed and decided to reflect such information on their respective interest 
rates from 2001 to December 31, 2006. 
2) Arguments by the Life Insurance Companies
The life insurance companies, during the KFTC proceeding, argued that 
the post-2001 violations (the Second Conduct) alleged by the KFTC was 
merely a “simple information exchange” and should not be deemed an 
agreement of unreasonable collaborative acts as prescribed under the 
MRFTA. After the life insurance companies’ argument above had been 
rejected by the KFTC, the companies filed an administrative appeal with 
the court by contending that the KFTC’s disposition was unlawful on the 
grounds that the life insurance companies had independently set their 
respective interest rates without any agreements among them and that the 
external appearance of each company’s estimated and nominal interest 
rates did not actually conform to each other. 
2. Decision by the Seoul High Court 
The Seoul High Court held that the KFTC’s disposition in the Life 
Insurer Case was unlawful based on the grounds that information 
exchange (the Second Conduct) alone was insufficient to constitute an 
“unreasonable collaborative act.”24)
When the key grounds for the decision of each court is examined, first, 
the Seoul High Court, Administrative Department No. 6 held:
24) The departments in charge of presiding in administrative lawsuits filed on appeal 
from KFTC decisions in the Seoul High Court are Administrative Department Nos. 2, 6 and 7, 
which form the bench that specializes in antitrust matters, and each department 
independently makes decisions on each case. In the Life Insurer Case, the Seoul High Court, 
Administrative Department Nos. 6 and 7 were designated as the jurisdictional benches and 
each bench subsequently rendered several rulings on the objections filed by the life insurance 
companies.  
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“Unlike foreign legal regimes which regulate ‘concerted 
practices’ such as information exchanges among enterprisers as a 
type of cartel, the MRFTA deems the  fact that [the enterprisers] 
mutually exchanged information insufficient and requires the 
existence of a meeting of the minds to ‘jointly determine prices’ in 
order to constitute a prohibited collaborative act. However, in the 
present matter, it is difficult to conclude that there was an agreement 
to ‘jointly determine’, since the sixteen life insurance companies 
‘determined their respective interest rates independently’ while 
participating in the information exchange.”25)
Additionally, the Seoul High Court, Administrative Department No. 7 
held:
“Since an act’s external conformity is not one of the requirements 
for establishing unreasonable collaborative acts, absence of such 
external conformity does not definitively indicate that there was no 
agreement present. However, without direct evidence for the 
existence of an Article 19(1) Agreement, the absence of external 
conformity may serve as compelling evidence that impedes the 
inference of the existence of an agreement, if such external 
nonconformity is substantial and the period of nonconformity 
extends for a substantial amount of time, and when it cannot be 
reasonably explained.”
Moreover, the same administrative bench added:
“Agreements which condone a ‘substantial gap in interest rates’ 
based on each company’s individual circumstances without 
25) See Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2012Nu2346, July 17, 2013 (S. Kor.); see also, 
Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2012Nu2209, July 13, 2013 (S. Kor.); Seoul High Court 
[Seoul High Ct.], 2012Nu2186, July 17, 2013 (S. Kor.); Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 
2012Nu2339, July 17, 2013 (S. Kor.); Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2012Nu2315, July 17, 
2013 (S. Kor.). 
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providing a consistent standard in connection with the range of 
interest rates (price range) presupposes a price competition based on 
the substantial gap in interest rates and, as such, these types of 
agreements do not conform to the characteristics of the agreements 
that unreasonably restrain competition as prescribed by the 
MRFTA.”26)
3. Decision by the Korean Supreme Court27)
1)  Determination Standard for the Existence of Agreements in Cases Where 
Information Exchange is at Issue
In the present case, the Korean Supreme Court offered a standard for 
determining the existence of “agreements to commit acts which 
unreasonably restrain competition” that are prohibited by Article 19(1) of 
the MRFTA in cases where “competitors exchanged information regarding 
important competitive elements such as prices”.
First, the Korean Supreme Court held:
“The ‘unreasonable collaborative acts’ prohibited by Article 19(1) 
of the MRFTA is defined as an ‘agreement with respect to acts which 
unreasonably restrain competition’, and an ‘agreement’ in such case 
includes not only explicit agreements, but also implied agreement. See 
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Do1239, Feb. 28, 2003 (S. Kor.). 
However, since an agreement essentially requires communication of 
intentions among two or more enterprisers, only having an external 
appearance that coincides with the occurrence of ‘unreasonable 
collaborative acts’ enumerated in each of the subparagraphs in the 
foregoing provision cannot definitively establish the existence of an 
agreement. Rather, circumstances that warrant the finding of reciprocity 
in meeting of the minds among enterprisers have to be established and the 
26) See Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2012Nu2308, Jan. 23, 2014 (S. Kor.); see also, 
Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2012Nu2193, Jan. 23, 2014 (S. Kor.); Seoul High Court 
[Seoul High Ct.], 2012Nu2216, Jan. 23, 2014 (S. Kor.); and Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 
2012Nu2322, Jan. 23, 2014 (S. Kor.). 
27) See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2013Do16951, July 24, 2014 (S. Kor.); see also, Supreme 
Court [S. Ct.], 2014Do3853, July 24, 2014 (S. Kor.).
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burden of proof for the foregoing lies with the Defendant [i.e., the 
KFTC] which imposed the corrective orders and other dispositions 
based on the existence of such agreement (emphasis added).” Supreme 
Court [S. Ct.], 2012Do17421, Nov. 28, 2013 (S. Kor.).
In other words, while the Korean Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
position it took in previous cases, which embraced the broad scope of the 
term “agreement”, it accentuated the fact that, at minimum, the KFTC has 
the burden of establishing the “existence of an agreement”, i.e., the 
reciprocity in meeting of the minds among enterprisers, as a requirement 
for establishing unreasonable collaborative acts.
The Korean Supreme Court further noted:
“If competitors exchanged information on important competitive 
elements such as prices, such information exchange removes the 
uncertainty in decision-making, i.e., pricing decisions, thereby acting 
as a means to facilitate or promote the formation of a cartel. 
Therefore, although [information exchange] can be used as compelling 
evidence in finding reciprocity in meeting of the minds among 
enterprisers, despite such role, the existence of information exchange 
alone cannot definitively infer the existence of an agreement to commit acts 
which unreasonably restrain competition. Rather, the existence of an 
agreement has to be established by comprehensively considering the totality 
of circumstances including the structure and characteristics of the relevant 
market, the nature and content of the exchanged information, the 
perpetrator, timing and method of information exchange, the intent and 
purpose of information exchange, the existence of external conformity 
among the enterprisers in prices or outputs after participating in 
information exchange or the extent of the gap in prices or outputs, the 
process and content of the decision-making in connection with the external 
conformity and other impacts that information exchange has on the market 
(emphasis added).”
In sum, the Korean Supreme Court, for the first time, presented a 
specific standard for determining the existence of unlawful “agreements” in 
a case involving information exchange as stated above. 
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2)  Whether Information Exchange among the Life Insurance Companies 
Constitutes an “Agreement” under the MRFTA
The Seoul High Court found the issuance of corrective order and 
imposition of administrative surcharge by the Defendant (the KFTC) to be 
unlawful based on the fact that the basis of such disposition was the 
Plaintiff’s engagement in unreasonable collaborative acts with fifteen other 
life insurance companies. The Seoul High Court arrived at the foregoing 
conclusion without even reviewing other arguments forwarded by the 
Defendant based on the following grounds: (i) unless the fact that sixteen 
insurance companies including the Plaintiff agreed to jointly fix, maintain 
or modify prices from 2001 to 2006 can be established, the evidence of such 
enterprisers’ participating in information exchange in connection with the 
future estimated interest rates and nominal interest rates alone is 
insufficient to definitely infer the existence of an unreasonable collaborative 
act and (ii) the fact that the sixteen life insurance companies including the 
Plaintiff had set their respective interest rates by participating in the 
information exchange from 2001 to 2006 alone is insufficient evidence to 
establish the existence of an agreement to “jointly set the Estimated Interest 
Rates, Etc.” The Korean Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the decision 
of the Seoul High Court.
V. Implications of the Decision in the Life Insurer Case
1.  Existence of the Article 19(1) Agreement is Unable to Establish Based 
Solely on the Existence of Information Exchange
In the foregoing Life Insurer Decision, the Korean Supreme Court held 
that it was unable to establish the existence of an agreement based solely on 
the existence of information exchange and that such exchange alone may 
only be employed as compelling evidence in establishing the reciprocity in 
meeting of the minds. In other words, the decision in the Life Insurer Case 
is meaningful as a precedent because it clearly stipulated that information 
exchange alone is insufficient evidence in establishing the existence of 
unreasonable collaborative acts under the MRFTA and that separate 
evidence for the “existence of an agreement” is necessary.
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2.  External Conformity as a Requirement for the Presumption of an 
Agreement
In circumstances where the existence of an agreement is uncertain 
despite the finding of information exchange, the KFTC has the burden of 
establishing the existence of reciprocity in the meeting of the minds among 
the enterprisers. However, in fulfilling the foregoing burden of proof, the 
inquiry on whether external conformity is absolutely necessary in establishing 
the existence of an agreement may become an issue. The Korean Supreme 
Court addressed the above issue in its decision for the Life Insurer Case by 
classifying “the external conformity among enterprisers with respect to 
prices and outputs after participating in the information exchange” as one 
of several elements to be considered in determining the existence of an 
agreement. Therefore, it may be understood that the Korean Supreme 
Court views “external conformity” as one of the plus factors to be 
considered rather than an essential element for inferring the existence of an 
Article 19(1) Agreement.28) Consequently, however, since it is difficult to 
presume the existence of an agreement when external nonconformity is 
substantial despite the existence of information exchange, external 
conformity may be deemed as the most important element in inferring the 
existence of an agreement in actual practice, particularly when indirect or 
circumstantial evidence sufficient to infer the existence of agreements other 
than information exchange is weak.
28) This is similar to the legal theory developed in the U.S., which views information 
exchange as one of the various plus factors considered in addition to conscious parallelism 
that could presume the existence of an agreement.
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3.  Concerted Practices and the Issue of Establishing Unreasonable 
Collaborative Acts
The section that warrants particular attention in the decision for the Life 
Insurer Case is the section that clarified the legal principle requiring courts 
to make decisions pursuant to the text of the MRFTA and warning them 
not to cite directly to the EU’s legal theories regarding “concerted practices” 
in determining illegality of information exchanges. 
In the “beverage cartel decision” introduced above, the Seoul High 
Court held to the effect that “agreements to commit collaborative acts may 
be inferred if concerted practices rather than simple conscious parallelism is 
present.”29) However, the KFTC also contended in the Life Insurer Case that 
the second information exchange carried out by the sixteen life insurance 
companies including the Plaintiff constituted a prohibited collaborative act 
under the MRFTA as a so-called “concerted practice.”
However, the Seoul High Court, Administrative Department No. 6, 
clearly held:
“Unlike the foreign legal regimes which regulate ‘concerted practices’ 
such as information exchange as a type of a cartel in addition to the 
agreements among enterprisers, the MRFTA deems enterprisers 
mutual exchange of information regarding prices insufficient to 
establish unreasonable collaborative acts and further requires a 
meeting of the minds to ‘jointly fix prices’ to be present (emphasis 
added).”
The Korean Supreme Court also affirmed the foregoing decision on the 
ground that there was no illegality in the lower court’s decision because the 
Seoul High Court did not misinterpret the legal theories governing the 
relationship between information exchanges and unreasonable 
collaborative acts and between concerted practices and unreasonable 
29) The foregoing decision has been criticized for being inconsistent with the statutory 
interpretation of the Korean law, which did not stipulate “concerted practice” itself as a 
separate type of cartel. See Ahn Chang Heon, supra note 8, at 404-07.
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collaborative acts.
In other words, the Korean Supreme Court took the position that 
“information exchange” is not a type of unreasonable collaborative act or a 
type of agreement under the statutory interpretation of the MRFTA. 
However, the Court noted that information exchange may be viewed as 
compelling evidence to establish the existence of an agreement, i.e., the 
reciprocity in meeting of the minds.
Such decision by the Korean Supreme Court may be contrasted with the 
decision rendered by the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) in the 
banana importers case decided on March 19, 2015. In such case, the CJEU 
held that the act of exchanging diverse market information that could 
potentially impact prices prior to pricing decisions of competitors was a 
violation of Article 101(1) of the TFEU as a “concerted practice with an 
anticompetitive purpose.”30) According to the CJEU, for concerted practices 
under Article 101(1) of the TFEU, illegality may be found even when the practice 
does not reach the level of an “agreement” to jointly decide competitive elements 
and, so long as the information exchange continues to be carried out and 
the relevant enterprisers remain active in the market, the exchanged 
information will be presumed to be reflected on the pricing decisions of the 
relevant enterprisers.31)
VI. Conclusion
The decision in the Life Insurer Case can be assessed as a landmark case 
that accurately prescribed the significance and the meaning of information 
exchange among competitors in establishing unreasonable collaborative 
acts, while not damaging the significance of the existence of an agreement 
under the current MRFTA regime.
In other words, it may be viewed that, while the Korean courts 
30) See Case C-286/13P, Dole Food and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v. Commission (Mar. 19, 
2015), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-286/13%20P. 
31) Jeong Se-Hoon & Choi In-Sun, Europesabeobjaepansoeui Banana Suyibeobja Sageoneui 
Pangyeolgwa Sisajeom [The Court of Justice of European Union Decision on the Banana 
Importer Case and Its Implications], 180 GyeonGjaenG journal [Competition journal] 93 (May 
2015). 
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sympathize with the need for regulating furtive cartel activities perpetrated 
through information exchange in line with the recent trends in competition 
law enforcement in the U.S. and EU, at the same time, the Korean courts 
attempt to develop an independent system that is consistent with the 
Korean laws by remaining faithful to the interpretation of the provisions of 
the MRFTA. 
Some commentators have recently raised opinions which call for 
effective regulation of cartel activities which are executed through 
information exchange by means of legislative amendments to prohibit 
information exchange itself, as is the case in the EU, since regulating the 
above cartel activities under the MRFTA has become more difficult.32)
Obviously, it is difficult to view that the above noted precedents and 
case laws alone resolved all of the questions in regard to the required 
degree of proof that the KFTC has to provide in order to establish the 
existence of an agreement or the permitted extent of information exchange 
for the enterprisers in individual and specific cases. It is also true that 
certain issues still need to be resolved, such as whether information 
exchange should be regulated as unreasonable collaborative acts in the case 
where (i) a certain level of information exchange may be necessary to 
develop products in certain industries (i.e., the insurance industry) due to 
the inherent characteristics of the business or (ii) information exchange was 
carried out under administrative guidance of a supervisory authority such 
as the Financial Supervisory Service. 
However, based on the fact that information exchange between 
competing enterprisers, together with other circumstantial evidence, 
remains compelling evidence to find the existence of an agreement, it is 
difficult to conclude that a false negative would likely result with respect to 
information exchange which has a harmful effect on competition, even if no 
legislative changes are implemented in the near future. Even without any 
legislative changes, the effectiveness of regulating information exchange 
could be secured based on accumulation of enforcement examples from 
32) Kang Jiwon & Kim Ae-Jin, Jeongbogyohwaneul tonghan damhaphangwieeui hyogwajeokin 
gyujerul wiehan gaeseonbangan [Improvement Proposal for Effective Regulation of Cartel Perpetrated 
by Information Exchange] 58 (Gughoeibbeobjosacheo [National Assembly Research Service], 
Working Paper No. 277, Dec. 2015).
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precedents from the KFTC and case laws from courts.
